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Abstract Water policies in many sub-Saharan African countries stipulate that rural communities are
responsible for self-financing their waterpoint’s operation and maintenance. In the absence of policy
consensus or evidence on optimal payment models, rural communities adopt a diversity of approaches to
revenue collection. This study empirically assesses waterpoint sustainability and access outcomes associated
with different revenue collection approaches on the south coast of Kenya. The analysis draws on a unique
data set comprising financial records spanning 27 years and 100 communities, operational performance
indicators for 200 waterpoints, and water source choices for more than 2000 households. Results suggest
communities collecting pay-as-you-fetch fees on a volumetric basis generate higher levels of revenue and
experience improved operational performance compared with communities charging flat fees. In both
cases, financial flows mirror seasonal rainfall peaks and troughs. These outcomes are tempered by evidence
that households are more likely to opt for an unimproved drinking water source when a pay-as-you-fetch
system is in place. The findings illuminate a possible tension between financial sustainability and universal
access. If the Sustainable Development Goal of ‘‘safe water for all’’ is to become a reality, policymakers and
practitioners will need to address this issue and ensure rural water services are both sustainable and
inclusive.
1. Introduction
Community-based financing is widely regarded as a precondition for waterpoint sustainability in rural sub-
Saharan Africa [Churchill et al., 1987; Briscoe and de Ferranti, 1988; Carter et al., 1996, 1999; Harvey, 2007].
Community management has been the dominant rural water supply paradigm embraced by governments,
donors, and nongovernment organizations (NGOs) for over three decades, and is premised upon the expec-
tation that local water users are willing and able to self-organize and cover the cost of operation and main-
tenance (O&M) activities [Arlosoroff et al., 1987; Harvey and Reed, 2007]. Although taxes and transfers play a
role in subsidizing major repairs [see, e.g., Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE), 2011; Ministry of Local
Government and Housing (MLGH), 2007; Jones, 2013], technician salaries and equipment [see, e.g., Hystra,
2011], and spare part supply chains [Harvey, 2007], the bulk of funding to pay for O&M costs is expected to
derive from tariffs paid by waterpoint users. Indeed, the principle of self-financing O&M is now formalized
in policies and assumed in many financing plans across the continent [African Development Bank, 2010;
Banerjee and Morella, 2011; GLAAS, 2014]. However, there is an absence of empirical evidence or policy con-
sensus on the optimal revenue collection approach from financial, operational and safe drinking water
access perspectives, and communities independently adopt a diverse range of strategies.
The arguments in support of community-based financing of rural water O&M are multifold, and sit within a
broader debate about user financing of basic social services [Reddy and Vandemoortele, 1996]. Governments
and donors have long been considered ill-equipped to reliably finance recurrent water service costs [Briscoe
and de Ferranti, 1988; Churchill et al., 1987]. Additionally, the expectation of self-financing fits with the ten-
dency of donors and NGOs to approach water supply interventions as one-off projects, the importance
placed on local ownership of water supply systems, and a cultural idealization that rural communities will
harmoniously cooperate and act collectively [Franceys et al., 2016; Harvey and Reed, 2007]. Briscoe and de
Ferranti [1988] also advance justifications based on principles of equity and efficiency, as user contributions
raise money in a nondistortionary way, minimize waste, and liberate donor and government funds to
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expand improved water supply access to the poorest and hardest to reach. Notwithstanding these ration-
ales, the principle of financing direct O&M costs through user tariffs has not gone uncontested. Ahuja et al.
[2010], for example, suggest subsidies may be justified by evidence that rural households often undervalue
safe drinking water and that behavioral biases prevent welfare-maximizing choices. Equally, it has been not-
ed that other sectors, such as education and health, have been more open to the option of subsidizing serv-
ices, thereby enabling the reduction or abolition of user fees [Ahuja et al., 2010; Franceys et al., 2016].
Nonetheless, there appears to be a mismatch between policy and reality in the rural water sector, with evi-
dence suggesting that user contributions are the exception rather than the norm in rural areas. Nationally
representative surveys across 19 sub-Saharan African countries in 2008–2009 found only 30% of rural
households pay for water (Figure 1), at a time when improved water coverage in rural areas those countries
collectively stood at 54% [UNICEF/WHO, 2016]. In contrast, the same surveys found three in four households
paid for water in urban settings [Afrobarometer, 2015]. The problem is acute for community waterpoints fit-
ted with handpumps; in some countries around three in five lack any form of revenue collection, and non-
payment and late payment practices are prevalent [Foster and Hope, 2016]. The implications of this situation
are substantial. The inability of communities to raise sufficient funds to pay for repairs is a major reason
why the operational performance of handpumps is often poor [Carter et al., 1999; Harvey, 2007], and by
extension, why an estimated one in three are nonfunctional at any point in time [Rural Water Supply Net-
work, 2009].
Although handpumps are considered a low-cost technology, the amount of money required to ensure their
ongoing operation in aggregate terms is substantial. MacArthur [2015] approximates that 823,000 water-
points are fitted with handpumps across the continent, serving up to 184 million people. Combining these
coverage estimates with handpump O&M unit costs formulated by WASHCost [2012], the recurrent hand-
pump expenditure requirements across sub-Saharan Africa may lie between $368 million and $552 million
(PPP, 2011) a year. Furthermore, an estimated 60,000 waterpoints are fitted with handpumps every year
[Sansom and Koestler, 2009], thus recurrent expenditure needs could be rising by $26 million to $41 million
(PPP, 2011) annually.
1.1. Rural Waterpoint Revenue Collection Approaches in Policy and Practice
While government involvement in water tariff regulation is widely accepted and practiced in urban settings
[Banerjee and Morella, 2011], engagement in rural waterpoint tariff formulation is less pronounced. In con-
trast to utility-provided piped water services, the distinction between users and water service providers for
community-managed rural waterpoints is ambiguous. Concerns about monopolistic profit-making and
Figure 1. Proportion of households that pay for water in rural sub-Saharan Africa in 2008/2009 (n 5 17,156). Authors’ analysis of data from
Afrobarometer household surveys [Afrobarometer, 2015].
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consumer exploitation therefore take a lower priority. Although price setting for rural waterpoint repair
services is not always beyond the purview of local governments [see, e.g., Mommen and Nekesa, 2010], poli-
cies are commonly agnostic about revenue collection approach. This is perhaps unsurprising given
community-based decision-making regarding waterpoint tariffs is a central tenet of community manage-
ment and participatory planning.
Among those policy, strategy, and guideline documents that venture into the realm of rural water tariffs,
there is little consensus about preferred payment models and guidance is often non-specific. For example,
the rural water supply strategy in Sierra Leone advocates for tariffs in the ‘‘form of levies, monthly payments
per household or periodic harvests’’ [Ministry of Water Resources (MWR), 2013]. Uganda’s rural water O&M
framework leaves it up to communities to choose any one of nine methods [MWE, 2011], and the African
Development Bank [2010] guidelines present an even greater multiplicity of possibilities relating to how,
when and where funds could be collected. Guidance in Malawi and Tanzania simply advises communities
to collect ‘‘maintenance funds from each user household’’ and ‘‘establish a mechanism to pay the full costs
of O&M’’ respectively [Ministry of Irrigation and Water Development (MIWD), 2010; Ministry of Water and Live-
stock Development (MWLD), 2002]. At the more prescriptive end of the spectrum, Ghana’s Community Water
and Sanitation Agency [2011] stipulates that handpumps should be accompanied by pay-as-you-fetch
(PAYF, also known in other contexts as ‘‘pay-as-you-go’’) revenue collection systems, while Zambia’s hand-
pump O&M guidelines suggest fixed financial contributions could be made monthly, bi-annually or annually
[MLGH, 2007].
Data from over 90,000 waterpoints fitted with handpumps in five countries indicate the most common rev-
enue collection strategy is reactive contributions when a handpump breaks down, followed by flat fee pay-
ments (weekly, monthly, or annual) and pay-as-you-fetch fees (per jerrican or bucket) (Table 1). Significant
variation in preferred strategies is evident across countries and regions. For instance, while PAYF appears to
be relatively uncommon in Table 1, between 50% and 90% of communities in certain regions of Ghana
have such a system in place [Komives et al., 2008; Adank et al., 2013]. Diverse approaches have even been
noted within individual villages in Mali [Jones, 2010]. To add to the complexity, communities sometimes
assume hybrid, dynamic or differential tariff permutations based on a host of factors, including membership
status, purpose of water use, family size, livestock ownership, religious holidays, and rainfall season.
1.2. Community Waterpoints: Common-Pool Resource or Private Good?
Economists commonly characterize goods and services according to the twofold criteria of subtractability
and excludability. Subtractability—also known as rivalry—describes the extent to which one person’s con-
sumption reduces the availability of the good or service for others. Excludability refers to the degree to
which consumption of a good or service can be denied. Samuelson [1954] proposed the concept of
Table 1. Prevalence of Revenue Collection Approaches for Waterpoint Fitted With Handpumps in Selected Sub-Saharan African
Countriesa












Kenyab Eight countiesc 2119 8.1 22.2 21.8 47.8
Liberiad National 9388 30.2 16.6 53.2
Sierra Leonee National 12,003 15.5 2.1 2.3 80.0
Tanzaniaf National 21,884 13.2 22.0 6.8 57.9
Uganda National 47,200 57.2
Total 92,594 17.4g 15.5g 4.7g 59.6 (62.4g)
aModified from Foster and Hope [2016]. Authors’ analysis based on publicly available waterpoint data sets [Virtual Kenya, 2015;
NWSHPC, 2014; Sierra Leone STATWASH Portal, 2014; Government of Tanzania, 2014; Government of Uganda, 2012]. Data for Liberia, Sierra
Leone, and Uganda also available at https://www.waterpointdata.org/.
bRevenue collection prevalence rates exclude 229 handpumps with unknown revenue collection status.
cCounties include Busia, Embu, Isiolo, Kajiado, Kiambu, Kisumu, Kwale, Turkana.
dRevenue collection prevalence rates exclude 51 handpumps with unknown revenue collection status.
eRevenue collection prevalence rates exclude 682 handpumps which were still under construction, and 12 handpumps with
unknown revenue collection status.
fRevenue collection prevalence rates exclude 2899 handpumps with unknown revenue collection status.
gExcludes data from Uganda, which do not distinguish between revenue collection approach.
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subtractability as a way of distinguishing between private and public goods, while the importance of
excludability emerged by way of landmark analyses of collective action [Olson, 1965], common-pool resour-
ces [Hardin, 1968], and club goods [Buchanan, 1965]. Soon after, Musgrave and Musgrave [1973] combined
the attributes of excludability and subtractability into a single framework, with Ostrom and Ostrom [1977]
subsequently populating their two-by-two matrix with four types of goods: (i) private goods, (ii) public
goods, (iii) club (toll) goods, and (iv) common-pool resources.
Depending on the context, water can assume features of any of the four types of goods [Haneman, 2006;
Young and Loomis, 2014; Easter and Feder, 1997]. Community waterpoints equipped with handpumps in
rural sub-Saharan Africa have typically been regarded as a common-pool resource [Naiga and Penker, 2014;
Foster and Hope, 2016], on the premise that use is subtractable and excluding noncontributors is difficult.
This assumption of low excludability is grounded upon the observation that measures to prevent noncontri-
butors from accessing the handpump are often weak or absent. Subtractability reflects the reality that use
of the handpump incurs a marginal cost greater than zero, be that in the form of a unit operation and main-
tenance cost (i.e., ‘‘wear and tear’’), a contribution to queues and congestion at the waterpoint, or a reduc-
tion in the availability of the groundwater resource. Hardin [1965] predicted overuse and degradation
would be the inevitable fate of common pool resources, on the assumption that narrow self-interest of
users would trump cooperative endeavors to manage the resource collectively. Applying this pessimistic
forecast to communal waterpoints fitted with handpumps, one might expect rampant free-riding, resulting
in insufficient funds to carry out repair work when the system breaks down. However, as with other
resource types [see, e.g., Wade, 1987; Basurto and Ostrom, 2009], the reality has proved more complex than
this simplified prognosis. There are instances of communities successfully managing and financing water-
point O&M over many years, just as there are cases where communities fail to establish and sustain revenue
collection systems, with waterpoints quickly falling into a state of disrepair.
A low level of excludability need not be an inherent property of waterpoints if communities are able to
apply institutional and physical measures to restrict access [Koehler et al., 2015]. Generally speaking, the
characteristic of excludability is both mutable and a question of degree [Baumol, 1986]. The approach to
revenue collection—in particular, pay-as-fetch (PAYF)—may have an important bearing on a waterpoint’s
level of excludability. Usage under a PAYF regime is contingent on a concurrent payment to an attendant
who is located at the waterpoint during hours of operation to monitor use and regulate access. The atten-
dant sells the water on a volumetric basis, and their remuneration is commonly linked to the overall sales.
As excludability is an inherent basis of PAYF arrangements, community waterpoints morph into a private
good, theoretically reducing the risk of free-riding and lessening the collective action demands in relation
to rule compliance and enforcement. In contrast, when regular flat fees or reactive contributions upon
breakdown are levied, a household’s water use for the relevant period commonly precedes payment, mak-
ing cooperation more dependent on mutual trust, shared norms, and the threat of sanctions. While in some
situations these arrangements can engender high levels of compliance, evidence of nonpayment practices
suggests they are susceptible to free-riding [Foster and Hope, 2016]. Over time, the imposition of sanctions
may result in de facto excludability measures for past defaulters; however the incentives to continuously
monitor and regulate waterpoint usage in order to enforce access rules are likely to be weaker than under a
PAYF model, and a second-order free-rider problem may emerge.
A waterpoint’s level of excludability also has potential consequences for its accessibility, and therefore
raises broader policy issues. The concept of accessibility lies at the heart of global and national policy
goals, frameworks, and laws, most notably the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) for universal access
to safe drinking water and the human right to water [UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, 2003; United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), 2010]. A comprehensive evaluation of waterpoint
revenue collection approaches must therefore consider both the consequences for the financial and
operational performance of the water service, and the drinking water source choices of households. Of
particular pertinence is whether operational measures that promote the sustainable delivery of safe water
services undermine the inclusiveness of those services. Any potential tension between these goals could
have important implications for an SDG and human right that conjoin universal safe water access with
notions of affordability, equitability and availability. In this way, a holistic analysis of PAYF arrangements
must navigate similar concerns pertaining to the use of prepaid meters in urban areas [Heymans et al.,
2014; Wesson, 2011].
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The ramifications of revenue collection approaches extend beyond just a waterpoint’s level of excludability,
and there are a number of other possible trade-offs. Each strategy has potential advantages and disadvan-
tages relating to the conduciveness to cash flow patterns of users, susceptibility to misappropriation, and
availability of cash on hand when breakdowns occur. However, a discussion of pros and cons is necessarily
theoretical, as there is a dearth of empirical evidence on the implications of different revenue collection
approaches. Some observations are supportive of PAYF systems in terms of revenue generation, though
they reveal little about whether greater revenue levels translate into more reliable water services. Based on
findings from a major handpump sustainability study, Harvey [2007] suggests that PAYF arrangements draw
in the most revenue. Private operators of rural waterpoints—though uncommon—also tend to prefer a
PAYF revenue model [Keesiga and Kimera, 2014; Haas and Nagarajan, 2011], suggestive of superior income
generation. Even sparser are insights into the access outcomes associated with different approaches. Chur-
chill et al. [1987] ventures a rare opinion on the matter, cautioning that tying waterpoint fees to volumetric
consumption could discourage water use among low-income households, or cause them to revert to unim-
proved sources.
1.3. Study Aims
This study seeks to empirically assess whether choice of revenue collection approach—particularly
PAYF—influences the financial performance, operational sustainability, and use of community water-
points in Kwale, Kenya. The investigation sets out to test whether different revenue collection
approaches lead to disparities in the amount of income collected (taking into account both revenue and
expenditure), operational downtime, and use of unimproved drinking water sources. The analyses utilize




Kwale County is located on the south coast of Kenya, between the city of Mombasa to the north, and Tanza-
nia to the south. In 2013, Kwale had a population of approximately 730,000 people, four-fifths of whom
lived in rural areas [Commission on Revenue Allocation, 2013]. Based on a poverty gap index measure, the
region is one of the most impoverished in Kenya, ranked 41st out of 47 counties [Commission on Revenue
Allocation, 2013]. According to the census in 2009, protected wells and boreholes were the main sources of
water for 21.9% of the county’s households [Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2012].
Kwale holds an important place in the history of rural water supply programming in sub-Saharan Africa as it
was the location for the first ever large-scale deployment of Afridev handpumps [Baumann and Furey,
2013]. County government records suggest 574 waterpoints were equipped with Afridev handpumps
between 1983 and 1995, most drawing water from an unconfined aquifer in Pleistocene sands and coral
limestones. On average, these waterpoints had a static water level of 17.1 m and a yield of 2.6 m3 per hour
around the time of installation [Foster and Hope, 2016]. Community-based waterpoint committees were set-
up from the outset and tasked with the job of collecting user fees, usually on a monthly basis [Narayan-Par-
ker, 1988]. Community members were originally trained to service and repair handpumps in line with a
village-level operation and maintenance (VLOM) approach, though in the ensuing years many communities
began to make use of the services offered by professional handpump mechanics operating across larger
areas. The program was subsequently hailed for its achievements, and was considered an exemplar of
community-based water supply management [McCommon et al., 1990; Rondinelli, 1991; Black, 1998]. Figure
2 presents the locations of communal Afridev handpumps in Kwale in 2013, and their characteristics are
summarized in Table 2.
2.2. Data Collection
Data underpinning this study were collected in three separate campaigns: (a) a census of 571 waterpoints
fitted (or formerly fitted) with Afridev handpumps; (b) a survey of 3361 households near to the sampled
waterpoints; and (c) an audit of financial records kept by 100 water committees. Both the waterpoint census
and household surveys were undertaken by trained local enumerators and delivered in local languages, pre-
dominantly Swahili and Digo. Prior to data collection, research permits and approvals were obtained from
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the Government of Kenya’s National Council of Science and Technology and the Central University Research
Ethics Committee at the University of Oxford.
The waterpoint census was conducted in August 2013, and captured technical, institutional, operational,
financial, and geographical information through structured interviews. Waterpoints were excluded from
analysis in this study if they were not for communal use, or the handpump had been replaced by a sub-
mersible pump. Table 3 presents the revenue collection status of all communal waterpoints fitted with
an Afridev handpump. As part of the waterpoint census, respondents were also asked whether written
financial records were kept. For those communities who answered in the affirmative (n 5 213), a follow-
up visit was undertaken in January 2014, with the exception of 18 handpumps that could not be visited
for security reasons. At 100 communities, financial records were located and photographed for later
analysis.
Between August 2013 and January 2014, a questionnaire was administered to a random sample of
3361 households within the service area of communal waterpoints (mean of 6.3 households per water-
point, 4.6 residents per household). The
survey captured demographic, socio-
economic, and water use information for
each household and its members. A
cleaned sample of 3349 households was
used for analysis, excluding 12 cases with
poor respondent understanding or con-
cerns about the accuracy of responses.
2.3. Analysis
The analysis focused on sustainability and
access outcomes associated with three reve-
nue collection approaches: (i) PAYF arrange-
ments, whereby water is paid for by the
bucket/jerrican, (ii) flat fee arrangements,
Figure 2. Study site and location of communal waterpoints fitted with Afridev handpumps in Kwale County. Underlying satellite imagery:
Google, Terrametrics [2016].
Table 2. Characteristics of Communal Waterpoints Fitted With Afridev
Handpumps in Kwale (n 5 518)
Measure Mean (SD)
Yielda (m3/h) 2.6 (1.3)
Static water levelb (m) 15.5 (8.3)
pHc 6.60 (0.86)
Electrical conductivityc,d (mS/cm) 1182 (984)
Age (years) 21.0 (7.8)
Average distance from households to waterpoint (m) 137 (99)
Distance from waterpoint to spare part retailer (km) 21.9 (15.0)
aGovernment data on yield drawn from borehole drilling records for
201 waterpoints, and pertain to the time of installation.
bData on static water level drawn from borehole drilling records for
214 waterpoints, and pertain to the time of installation.
cWater quality characteristics measured for 288 waterpoints.
dIndividual electrical conductivity values were capped at 3999.
Water Resources Research 10.1002/2016WR019634
FOSTER AND HOPE WATERPOINT SUSTAINABILITY AND USE IN KENYA 6
whereby a fixed fee is paid on a periodic basis
(per week, month, year), and (iii) ad hoc
arrangements, whereby fees are not regularly
collected in advance of breakdown. Analysis
was conducted to quantify waterpoint revenue,
expenditure, net income and operational
downtime, and determine whether significant
differences in these outcome measures could
be observed between revenue collection
approaches. Access outcomes were evaluated
by testing whether any revenue collection
approach was significantly associated with
choice of unimproved drinking water sources.
All analyses were performed using the statistical
software package SPSS (Version 21).
2.3.1. Financial Performance
Financial data were collated separately for three types of recorded revenue: PAYF records presented as daily
water sales; flat fee records in the form of payments itemized by household (hereafter termed ‘‘flat fee pay-
ment’’ records); and flat fee records in the form of general cash flows (hereafter termed ‘‘flat fee cash flow’’
records). Although they covered fewer handpumps than the flat fee payment records, the flat fee cash flow
records had the advantage of including expenditure items, and also additional revenue that derived from
alternative income sources such as nonmember PAYF fees, membership registration payments, reactive or
special contributions, and fines imposed on rule-breakers. As a result, they were arguably a truer reflection
of how funds are generated in different ways, and also allowed for the calculation of net income (defined as
revenue minus expenditure). High quality records were denoted in two ways. First, ‘‘Type 1’’ high quality
records were identified where 12 or more consecutive months were represented. Second, ‘‘Type 2’’ high
quality records were defined as those where 12 or more consecutive months of the year were represented
and both revenue and expenditure were documented. As the records spanned 1987–2013, all monetary
amounts were converted to 2013 values by applying deflator factors obtained from the World Bank Devel-
opment Indicators database [World Bank, 2014]. Figures in 2013 Kenyan shillings were then converted to US
dollars using an exchange rate of 1 USD to 86.1 KES. Monetary amounts were also converted to US dollars
at purchasing power parity (PPP), with these results presented in the supporting information.
To compare financial performance across different revenue collection approaches, summary statistics for
revenue, expenditure and net income were calculated for all records and the two categories of high quality
records. To ascertain whether there were significant differences in the monetary amounts raised and
expended under different approaches, independent samples t tests were performed. Where homogeneity
of variances was violated, the Welch t test was run instead. Due to concerns regarding presence of outliers
and nonnormal distribution of residuals, Mann-Whitney U tests were also run to determine if there were dif-
ferences in the median values. Statistical significance was determined using the standard a 5 0.05 thresh-
old. Average revenue, expenditure, and net income amounts were then calculated by month to appraise
temporal variations, particularly in response to rainfall patterns.
2.3.2. Operational Performance
To determine whether revenue collection approach was associated with waterpoint operational perfor-
mance, a data set was created which included one outcome variable (downtime), eight control variables,
and four dichotomous variables of interest: (i) PAYF versus Flat fee, (ii) PAYF versus Ad Hoc, (iii) PAYF versus
Other, and (iv) Flat fee versus Ad Hoc. Downtime was defined as the number of days between the point of
initial breakdown and subsequent repair. As highlighted by Carter and Ross [2016], the duration of break-
down is an important indicator that provides a more nuanced understanding of waterpoint performance
beyond a binary functionality measure. To minimize recall bias, the analysis was limited to those water-
points that had broken down and been repaired at least once in the previous 12 months. Two hundred
waterpoints met this inclusion criterion. The number of breakdown events for each waterpoint was limited
to five. On the basis that all included waterpoints had undergone at least one repair in the previous 12
months (which must have been financed from some source), communities reporting that they collected no
fees were combined with those that reported they collected funds upon breakdown into a single category
Table 3. Revenue Collection Status of Communal Waterpoints Fitted
With Afridev Handpumps (n 5 518)
Revenue Collection Approach Frequency
Regular payments in advance of breakdown 255 (49.2%)






Pay-as-you-fetch (per jerrican/bucket) 125 (24.1%)
Reactive payments upon breakdown 89 (17.2%)
No revenue collection 173 (33.4%)
Total 518 (100%)a
aIncludes one waterpoint where revenue collection approach could
not be determined.
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labelled ‘‘ad hoc.’’ Control variables were chosen based on their plausibility as factors that might influence
waterpoint downtime, as drawn from empirical and theoretical rural water literature. They consisted of: (a)
average distance between households and the handpump [Mu et al., 1990; Naiga and Penker, 2014; Foster
and Hope, 2016; Arouna and Dabbert, 2010], (ii) distance to the closest alternative Afridev handpump [Foster
and Hope, 2016; Koehler at al., 2015], (iii) distance to the spare parts retailer [Foster, 2013], (iv) proximity of
the handpump technician [Foster, 2013], (v) user perceptions of water taste [Langenegger, 1987; Foster and
Hope, 2016], (vi) prevalence of productive water use [Foster and Hope, 2016], (vii) average household welfare
level [Arouna and Dabbert, 2012], and (viii) the number of repairs carried out in the previous 12 months.
After summary statistics were calculated, Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) were run to ascertain
whether revenue collection approach exhibited an association with downtime, while controlling for the
potential confounders. The GEE was the chosen analytical method as it adjusts for the correlation between
breakdown events pertaining to the same waterpoint, which would otherwise violate the independence
assumption underpinning traditional regression techniques. To assess the influence of outcome variable
outliers, GEEs with a log-transformed outcome variable were run, and results were compared. A series of
logistic regression GEEs were then run with outcome variables dichotomized at different downtime thresh-
olds, allowing for a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between revenue collection approach
and operational performance. The choice of correlation structure was based upon the lowest quasi-
likelihood under independence model criterion (QIC) statistic.
2.3.3. Waterpoint Access
In order to appraise the access implications of each revenue collection approach, first the prevalence of
alternative drinking water sources was calculated for all three revenue collection approaches in both wet
and dry season. Second, the odds of a household opting for an unimproved drinking water source was
determined across revenue collection approaches for both wet and dry season. This regression analysis
again employed GEEs to adjust for clustering of households around waterpoints, and controlled for distance
between the household and the waterpoint and user perceptions of taste of water in recognition of the
high value users place on these service attributes [Foster and Hope, 2016; Mu et al., 1990]. To limit recall
bias, analysis was limited to those households located in the service area of handpumps that were function-
al, or had been functional at some point in the previous 12 months. The definitions of unimproved sources
were based upon the Joint Monitoring Programme classifications [UNICEF/WHO, 2015]. The analysis was dis-
aggregated by welfare thirds (tertiles) to assess whether associations were consistent across different socio-
economic strata. These welfare tertiles were derived from a multidimensional welfare index constructed by
applying principal component analysis to household socio-economic indicators, including dwelling struc-
ture, asset ownership, education levels, and infrastructure characteristics, in accordance with the method
outlined by Filmer and Pritchett [2001] (see supporting information). Dividing households into three welfare
categories ensured sample sizes were large enough for the GEEs to converge.
3. Results
3.1. Financial Performance
Table 4 presents waterpoint revenue, expenditure, and net income summary statistics. Compared with flat
fees, PAYF regimes generated more revenue, had higher levels of expenditure, and overall returned a great-
er net income. Depending on the subset of records analyzed, annual PAYF sales per waterpoint were $299–
$313 greater than flat fee payment records, and $167–$249 higher than flat fee cash flow records. Although
annual costs associated with PAYF systems were $16–$86 greater than flat fee arrangements, in total PAYF
maintained net income levels that were $102–$232 higher.
Independent samples t tests and Mann-Whitney U tests found the difference in revenue between PAYF and
flat fee payment records was statistically significant (Table 5), as was the difference between PAYF and flat
fee cash flow records (High quality—Type 1). Disparities in expenditure were only significant when running
the Mann-Whitney U test on all records. The higher level of net income associated with PAYF was significant
for both types of high quality records when applying independent samples t tests, and the Mann-Whitney
U test also yielded a significant result for Type 2 high quality records.
The revenue generated by both PAYF and flat fee strategies varied considerably by month, and appeared to
rise and fall inversely with rainfall levels (Figure 3). Revenue tended to peak in February–March in the midst
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of the dry season, and fell to a minimum in May–June during the period of heaviest rainfall. A similar,
but less marked, pattern was also evident for expenditure. The seasonal fluctuations were also less apparent
for flat fee payment records. Relative to May–June, revenue levels in February-March were 2.9–3.2 times
greater for PAYF, 3.6–4.5 times greater for flat fee cash flow records, and 1.2–1.3 times greater for flat fee
payment records. Equivalent expenditure ratios were 1.5–2.1 for PAYF, and 2.1–4.1 for flat fees. Notably, rev-
enue from flat fee cash flow records was on par with flat fee payment records during the rainy period
(May–July) but was discernibly higher during the dry period between January and March. On average,
waterpoints with flat fees experienced net losses during the wettest period, whereas waterpoints with PAYF
generated a profit year-round (Figure 4). In both cases, net income is highest in the dry months of February
and March.
Table 4. Summary Statistics for Revenue, Expenditure, and Net Income by Revenue Collection Approacha
Financial Measures
(USD per Year)
All Records High Quality Records—Type 1b High Quality Records—Type 2c
Flat Fees Flat Fees Flat Fees
PAYF Cash Flow Payments PAYF Cash Flow Payments PAYF Cash Flow Payments
Revenue
Mean 421.5 254.2 122.5 436.5 191.9 123.9 458.8 209.8
SD 387.4 291.2 97.2 451.4 143.8 99.1 490.2 121.2
Median 276.6 148.8 91.5 270.2 158.0 92.1 282.9 176.8
Years of data 46.8 136.0 231.2 37.1 116.0 214.4 27.8 56.8
No. waterpoints 22 42 66 17 26 39 13 18
Expenditure
Mean 247.0 160.7 193.6 135.2 186.3 169.4
SD 234.1 175.2 119.7 92.9 131.1 120.0
Median 171.8 111.7 174.4 118.3 177.0 139.0
Years of data 35.6 107.9 31.2 84.1 27.8 56.8
No. waterpoints 19 40 14 22 13 18
Net income
Mean 229.6 126.9 244.3 41.4 272.5 40.4
SD 317.1 251.1 361.7 69.1 381.3 73.7
Median 114.3 55.4 111.7 30.6 111.7 33.3
Years of data 41.6 83.3 35.9 59.9 27.8 56.8
No. waterpoints 20 37 13 18 13 18
aNote: Results in International $PPP (2013) can be found in supporting information Table S1.
bDefined as 12 months or more of consecutive records.
cDefined as 12 months or more of consecutive records, including both revenue and expenditure data
Table 5. Differences in Revenue, Expenditure, and Net Income by Revenue Collection Approacha,c
Records
Independent Samples t Test Mann-Whitney U Test
Mean Diff (95% CI) P U Mean Rank p
PAYF Versus Flat Fee (Payments)
Revenue
All records 299.0 (125.9–472.1)b 0.002 1288 70.0 versus 36.0 <0.001
High quality records—Type 1 312.6 (78.8–546.3)b 0.012 518 39.5 versus 23.7 0.001
PAYF Versus Flat Fee (Cash Flow)
Revenue
All records 167.2 (24.8 to 339.3) 0.056 664 41.7 versus 27.7 0.004
High quality records—Type 1 244.6 (7.2–482.0)b 0.044 301 26.7 versus 18.9 0.047
High quality records—Type 2 249.0 (251.0 to 549.0)b 0.096 155 18.9 versus 13.9 0.135
Expenditure
All records 86.3 (222.9 to 195.5) 0.119 515 37.1 versus 26.6 0.029
High quality records—Type 1 58.4 (213.8 to 130.6) 0.109 200 21.8 versus 16.4 0.141
High quality records—Type 2 16.9 (278.1 to 111.8) 0.713 129 16.9 versus 15.3 0.650
Net income
All records 102.5 (250.8 to 255.6) 0.186 469 33.9 versus 26.3 0.098
High quality records—Type 1 202.9 (30.7–375.2)b 0.049 197 21.1 versus 14.6 0.060
High quality records—Type 2 232.2 (0.00–464.3) 0.050 171 20.1 versus 13.0 0.031
aNote: Bold values indicate statistically significant association (p< 0.05).
bWelch t test performed as homogeneity of variances was violated.
cNote: Results in International $PPP (2013) can be found in supporting information Table S2.
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3.2. Operational Performance
Table 6 summarizes the characteristics of waterpoints included in the downtime analysis, and Table 7
presents the results for the GEE assessment of downtime by revenue collection approach. Overall,
PAYF waterpoints experienced average downtime that was 21.8 days less than flat fees. When adjust-
ing for covariates, the difference in downtime between PAYF arrangements and both flat fee and ad
hoc revenue collection was statistically significant (equivalent to 17.5 days and 12.4 days, respective-
ly). All else held constant, there was no significant difference in downtime between flat fee and ad
hoc arrangements. When running the GEEs with the natural log of downtime, PAYF maintained a sta-
tistically significant advantage over flat fees, suggesting the relationship was not solely due to influ-
ential outliers.
The results of the GEE logistic regression analyses in Table 8 demonstrate that the adjusted odds of a water-
point being repaired within 21 and 30 days were significantly higher for PAYF systems relative to ad hoc
payments. Likewise, the adjusted odds of having repairs carried out within 30 days were significantly higher
Figure 3. Waterpoint revenue and expenditure by month. Monthly rainfall data extracted from Kwale Drought Monitoring Bulletins pre-
pared by Kenya’s National Drought Management Authority (http://www.ndma.go.ke/).
Figure 4. Waterpoint net income by month.
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for PAYF systems compared with flat fees, and the thresholds of 10 and 14 days attained p values of less
than 0.1. There were no significant results for any payment comparison between the downtime thresholds
of 2, 4, and 7 days. Nor were there significant results for downtime threshold when comparing flat fees and
ad hoc payments.
3.3. Waterpoint Access
The proportion of households opting for alternative drinking water sources by revenue collection approach
is presented in Figure 5, and adjusted odds ratios for unimproved drinking water source use are summa-
rized in Table 9. Use of alternative water sources was highest among households within the service area of
waterpoints with ad hoc payment arrangements (21.8% in dry season; 26.0% in wet season), followed by
PAYF (15.8%; 20.2%), and flat fees (12.0%; 13.2%). When adjusting for distance to the waterpoint and per-
ceptions of taste, households surrounding waterpoints with PAYF fees were significantly more likely to opt
for unimproved water sources than those in the vicinity of waterpoints with flat fees, a relationship that was
evident in both wet and dry seasons. The association was also significant for households in each of the top
two welfare tertiles. Relative to ad hoc fees, PAYF arrangements were only associated with greater use of
unimproved drinking water sources during the wet season for the middle welfare tertile. Taste and distance
to the waterpoint also emerged as significant predictors of unimproved water source use across seasons
and welfare strata.
4. Discussion
The analyses offer four major insights into how revenue collection approach can influence waterpoint
sustainability and drinking water source choices. First, PAYF revenue collection systems generate signifi-
cantly more revenue than flat fees. Although this advantage is tempered by a higher cost base, PAYF is








Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Outcome Variable
Downtime No. days a waterpoint is nonfunctional for each breakdown event 12.9 28.7 34.7 72.4 36.0 76.0
Control Variables
WP-HH Distance Average distance between reference waterpoint and user households (m) 132.6 82.1 143.5 116.3 131.2 61.2
WP-WP Distance Distance between reference waterpoint and nearest active
communal Afridev handpump (m)
809 579 607 289 828 1269
WP-SPR Distance Distance between reference waterpoint and spare parts retailer (km) 21.1 16.8 20.7 14.5 22.7 13.1
Community
mechanic
1 5 Handpump mechanic lives in same community as waterpoint 0.51 0.51 0.55 0.50 0.43 0.50
Taste Average rating of water taste across wet and dry season (1 5 good, 0 5 average, 21 5 poor) 0.62 0.43 0.65 0.42 0.47 0.56
Productive use Percentage of households who use waterpoint for livestock or irrigation (%) 23.2 15.3 25.5 15.1 24.3 18.9
Welfare index Average of a multidimensional index incorporating household
composition, dwelling structure, asset ownership, and infrastructure
measures (the higher the index, the higher the welfare level)
7.1 2.5 7.3 2.4 6.0 2.9
No. repairs Number of repairs carried out in last 12 months 2.4 1.3 2.8 1.5 1.9 1.1
aWP 5 waterpoint, HH 5 households, SPR 5 spare parts retailer.
Table 7. Results of GEE Regression Analysis With Downtime as Outcome Variablea
Tariff Structure
Event Downtime Loge (Event Downtime)
B (95% CI) p B (95% CI) p
PAYF versus Flat fee 17.5 (4.9–30.1) 0.007 0.39 (0.02–0.76) 0.039
PAYF versus Ad hoc 12.4 (1.2–23.6) 0.029 0.16 (20.25 to 0.57) 0.444
PAYF versus Otherb 13.2 (4.6–21.9) 0.003 0.26 (20.05 to 0.58) 0.099
Flat fee versus Ad hoc 27.5 (223.3 to 8.4) 0.357 20.24 (20.69 to 0.20) 0.280
aNote: Bold values indicate statistically significant association (p< 0.05). WP 5 waterpoint, HH 5 household, SPR 5 spare parts retailer.
Results adjust for WP-HH Distance, WP-WP Distance, WP-SPR Distance, community mechanic, taste, productive use, welfare index, and
number of breakdowns. Analysis includes 93 waterpoints (181 breakdown events) with PAYF, 62 waterpoints (171 breakdown events)
with flat fees, and 43 waterpoints (105 breakdown events) with ad hoc arrangements.
b‘‘Other’’ comprises both flat and ad hoc fees.
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still associated with higher levels of net income. Second, revenue and expenditure fluctuate according
to rainfall levels, with cash inflows and outflows peaking during the dry season. Third, PAYF systems
are significantly associated with shorter operational downtime, and a greater likelihood of repairs being
carried out within 3–4 weeks. Fourth, relative to flat fees, the adjusted odds of a household using an
unimproved drinking water source is significantly higher when they are located in the vicinity of a
PAYF waterpoint.
The higher levels of revenue generated by PAYF contributions accord with the hypothesis that a water-
point managed as an excludable private good can prevent free-riding, and reduce the collective action
burdens that might otherwise encumber common-pool resources. However, the disparity in financial
and operational outcomes may also in part be linked to the size and frequency of financial contribu-
tions involved. The mean PAYF tariff was $0.026 per 20 L ($1.3 per cubic meter), compared to the
mean annualized flat fee of $7.18 per household per year. Therefore, on average, a household could
only collect 15 L per day (less than one standard-sized jerrican) under a PAYF model if they were to
spend the same amount as the flat fee average. Notably, the mean PAYF tariff is around double the
average unit price charged by water utilities in African cities for customers with household connections
[Banerjee and Morella, 2011], and comparable to drinking water charges in some cities in high income
countries [International Water Association, 2014]. In other words, PAYF arrangements not only preclude
nonpayment and enforce cooperation, they also likely translate into a higher price of water per unit of
consumption.
Revenue summed from flat fee cash flow records was $68–$132 higher than flat fee payments, a disparity
that can be attributed to supplementary income sources beyond the standard household fee payments. For
the waterpoints that documented the source of additional revenue, 53.3% derived from PAYF sales to non-
members, 21.6% from membership fees, 18.1% from reactive contributions, 2.8% for ad hoc special collec-
tions, 2.4% from sale of goods or spare parts to other communities, and 1.8% from fines related to rule
breaking. This signifies that revenue collection strategies are far more complex and dynamic than
Table 8. Results of GEE Regression Analysis With Downtime Threshold as Outcome Variablea
Downtime
Threshold
PAYF Versus Flat Fee PAYF Versus Ad Hoc PAYF Versus Otherb Flat Fee Versus Ad Hoc
OR (95% CI) p OR (95% CI) p OR (95% CI) p OR (95% CI) p
2 days 1.08 (0.45–2.60) 0.862 0.65 (0.29–1.47) 0.305 0.84 (0.41–1.70) 0.625 0.64 (0.30–1.39) 0.260
4 days 1.43 (0.65–3.18) 0.377 0.81 (0.36–1.82) 0.615 1.06 (0.53–2.14) 0.861 0.66 (0.33–1.29) 0.219
7 days 1.38 (0.65–2.92) 0.405 1.08 (0.48–2.45) 0.844 1.24 (0.64–2.39) 0.521 0.67 (0.34–1.31) 0.240
10 days 1.91 (0.93–3.94) 0.080 2.06 (0.90–4.72) 0.087 1.96 (1.01–3.81) 0.048 0.96 (0.47–1.97) 0.917
14 days 2.35 (0.87–6.36) 0.092 2.26 (0.81–6.28) 0.118 2.32 (0.98–5.48) 0.056 1.10 (0.48–2.50) 0.823
21 days 2.24 (0.61–8.19) 0.222 3.45 (1.07–11.14) 0.039 2.53 (0.92–7.01) 0.073 1.22 (0.50–2.97) 0.655
30 days 7.00 (1.85–26.58) 0.004 7.43 (1.40–39.44) 0.019 1.73 (1.25–25.30) 0.025 1.07 (0.39–2.91) 0.896
aNote: Bold values indicate statistically significant association (p< 0.05). OR 5 Odds ratio. All results adjust for WP-HH Distance, WP-WP Distance, WP-SPR Distance, community
mechanic, taste, productive use, welfare index, and number of breakdowns. Analysis includes 93 waterpoints (181 breakdown events) with PAYF, 62 waterpoints (171 breakdown
events) with flat fees, and 43 waterpionts (105 breakdown events) with ad hoc arrangements.
b‘‘Other’’ comprises flat and ad hoc fees.
Figure 5. Percentage of households using alternative drinking water sources by revenue collection approach and season (n 5 2448).
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categorical survey responses suggest. It also indicates that a proportion of the overall revenue for flat fee
arrangements comes in the form of reactive payments, presumably to plug a shortfall when repairs are
needed. PAYF records lacked a similar diversity of revenue streams, suggesting revenue from PAYF sales is
generally sufficient to cover O&M costs when they arise, without the need for additional contributions to
make up for any deficit.
Although PAYF systems collect more cash, this is partially offset by a higher cost base in the order of $16–
$86 per year. Much of this disparity likely stems from the additional expenses incurred when remunerating
the attendants that are central to PAYF systems. For those waterpoints that disaggregated expenditure
items, the annual nonmaintenance cost component associated with PAYF was $54 higher than for flat fees
($88 versus $34). Furthermore, on average, attendant wages accounted for 28.5% of expenditure for PAYF
waterpoints, compared with 4.5% for flat fee systems. These could well be underestimates, as in some cases
the attendant wages may have been deducted from the revenue before it was recorded. Expenditure differ-
ences could also be linked to larger group sizes and higher levels of usage, which in turn may increase the
frequency of failures and drive up repair costs. The counter argument is that the volumetric nature of PAYF
fees might discourage handpump use for needs where water quality is deemed less important, such as
bathing and productive uses. This in turn could have perverse health consequences by undermining
hygiene behaviors that are contingent on sufficient quantities of water. Financial data is equivocal on the
matter: although PAYF waterpoints incur annual maintenance costs $31 higher than flat fee waterpoints
($139 versus $108), the difference may be negligible when weighing up unit maintenance costs per opera-
tional day that account for the additional downtime experienced under a flat fee system.
To our knowledge, this is the first time a seasonal trend in revenues and expenditures has been docu-
mented for community waterpoints in rural sub-Saharan Africa. This mirrors the observed impact of rainfall
on both water consumption and waterpoint maintenance workloads in rural areas of Kenya and Burkina
Faso [Foster, 2012; Curtis et al., 1993; Oxford/RFL, 2015]. The inverse relationship between revenue and rain-
fall is most likely linked to the increase in availability of alternative water sources during wet season brought
about by the creation of surface water bodies and opportunities to harvest rainwater. During these wetter
periods, users may therefore switch from the waterpoint to a more convenient or lower-cost alternative
source for some or all of their water needs. Concurrent with a reduced dependence on the waterpoint,
Table 9. Results of GEE Multivariable Regression Analysis With Unimproved Drinking Water Source as Outcome Variable (n52,190)a
Welfare Index Variables
Dry Season Wet Season
Odds Ratio (95% CI) p Odds Ratio (95% CI) p
Tertile 1 (Lowest) Revenue Collection
PAYF 1 1
Flat fee 0.481 (0.131–1.763) 0.270 0.369 (0.108–1.260) 0.112
Ad Hoc 1.144 (0. 485–2.698) 0.758 0.849 (0.404–1.788) 0.667
Taste 0.384 (0.248–0.596) <0.001 0.469 (0.310–0.710) <0.001
Distance 1.002 (1.000–1.004) 0.109 1.001 (0.999–1.003) 0.341
Tertile 2 Tariff
PAYF 1 1
Flat fee 0.158 (0.035–0.718) 0.017 0.105 (0.025–0.447) 0.002
Ad Hoc 0.624 (0.286–1.362) 0.237 0.406 (0.173–0.956) 0.039
Taste 0.297 (0.184–0.478) <0.001 0.318 (0.194–0.520) <0.001
Distance 1.002 (1.000–1.005) 0.074 1.003 (1.001–1.006) 0.004
Tertile 3 (Highest) Revenue Collection
PAYF 1 1
Flat fee 0.066 (0.004–0.995) 0.050 n.a.
Ad Hoc 1.351 (0.509–3.586) 0.546 0.997 (0.333–2.986) 0.995
Taste 0.271 (0.169–0.436) <0.001 0.275 (0.160–0.473) <0.001
Distance 1.004 (1.002–1.006) <0.001 1.003 (1.001–1.006) 0.018
All Revenue Collection
PAYF 1 1
Flat fee 0.107 (0.027–0.427) 0.002 0.123 (0.048–0.314) <0.001
Ad Hoc 0.768 (0.407–1.451) 0.416 0.769 (0.421–1.404) 0.392
Taste 0.402 (0.313–0.517) <0.001 0.416 (0.319–0.542) <0.001
Distance 1.002 (1.001–1.004) 0.002 1.002 (1.001–1.004) 0.002
aNote: Bold values indicate statistically significant association (p< 0.05).
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monitoring and enforcement of access rules may also weaken during wetter periods. When factoring in
additional revenue sources, flat fee cash flows exhibited far more seasonal variation than flat fee payments.
This discrepancy is probably due to the additional PAYF contributions by nonmembers and reactive pay-
ments which are included in cash flow calculations, both of which are more likely to fall within drier months.
This is corroborated by the fact revenue documented in flat fee cash flow records for the months of Febru-
ary and March was 2.1–3.3 times that of flat fee payments, yet the two data sources yielded similar esti-
mates for the wetter period in May and July.
The significant relationships observed in the operational downtime GEEs provide evidence that PAYF sys-
tems lead to improved waterpoint performance, to the magnitude of 10–20 days fewer downtime days per
breakdown once adjusted for covariates. Greater reserves of cash on hand and stronger financial incentives
to repair waterpoints promptly may both be contributing factors. Surprisingly, there was no evidence that
communities paying flat fees experience shorter downtime than those collecting funds on an ad hoc basis,
defying the theory that cash on hand would allow for prompter repairs. A possible explanation is that the
amount saved in advance under a flat fee arrangement is often insufficient to cover the cost of a repair and
reactive payments are still required, thereby amplifying the average downtime per breakdown. This hypoth-
esis is supported by the cash flow data, which shows reactive contributions are still commonly needed
where flat fee arrangements are in place. Moreover, high quality flat fee records reveal only a slim margin
between average revenue and expenditure, suggesting these arrangements are vulnerable to lumpy and
irregular maintenance costs. Adding weight to this argument is the conclusion that the downtime relation-
ship is most pronounced for a threshold of 30 days, perhaps indicative of costly major repairs that exceed
cash reserves for flat fee systems but not PAYF. The corollary is that simply collecting revenue to cover
‘‘average’’ handpump O&M costs is insufficient—a financial buffer is needed to cope with above-average
repair costs if and when they arise.
The dual associations between PAYF and both operational and financial outcomes concur with commonly
articulated foundations of water service sustainability. That is, financial and operational performance is
mutually reinforcing [Rouse, 2007]. Yet, on its own, revenue collection approach is by no means a panacea
for rural water sustainability. While PAYF may reduce the complexity of the collective action challenge, it
does not absolve water users from working collaboratively. Communities and water committees that decide
to adopt PAYF still need to agree on, and maintain oversight of, roles, responsibilities and rules. Ultimately,
their willingness and ability to carry out these tasks effectively are likely influenced by a myriad of social,
institutional, and environmental factors [Whittington et al., 2009; Foster, 2013; Fisher et al., 2015]. Although it
was associated with the shortest downtime relative to other approaches, repairs for PAYF waterpoints in
Kwale still took an average of 12.9 days to effect. By most measures, service disruptions of such length are
unsatisfactory [Hope, 2015], and adverse health ramifications of switching to unimproved water sources are
likely to materialize before this threshold is reached [Brown and Clasen, 2012]. Furthermore, 31.2% of water-
points accompanied by a PAYF arrangement had been in a state of disrepair for more than a year, a non-
functionality rate consistent with flat fees. This perhaps points to failure modes and other systemic
institutional weaknesses that revenue collection arrangements alone cannot address. While bolstering reve-
nue collection is critical if waterpoints are to shift from a low-level equilibrium to a virtuous cycle of strong
financial and operational performance, so too are other measures to support waterpoint reliability and rep-
arability. For this reason, external support is advocated across the spectrum of financial, administrative and
technical responsibilities that communities currently assume [Harvey and Reed, 2007; Rural Water Supply Net-
work, 2010; IRC, 2012]. Alternative maintenance models that reallocate roles, responsibilities, incentives and
risks among communities, government, and private enterprise have also been proposed as a pathway for-
ward [Harvey and Reed, 2007; Hope et al., 2012].
While the findings suggest PAYF has perverse implications in relation to safe drinking water access, it is
unclear to what extent this might be linked to the increased level of excludability or the higher unit cost of
water. Notably, the relationship holds for the top two welfare categories, indicating it is not attributable
solely to affordability factors. Either way, the result points to a tension between policy prescriptions pertain-
ing to financial sustainability and goals targeting expanded coverage of safe water supplies. On the one
hand, the global SDG and the Government of Kenya’s Vision2030 promote universal safe water access. So
too does the human right to water, as recognized under international law and enshrined in the Kenyan con-
stitution [UNGA, 2010; Government of Kenya, 2010]. At the same time, it is assumed in Kenya, and in most
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other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, that responsibility for financing rural water supply O&M rests with
communities. Yet in Kwale, the revenue collection strategy that is associated with the best financial and
operational outcomes also appears to drive a proportion of households towards unimproved water sources.
This presents a conundrum for practitioners and policy-makers: how to achieve universal access to safe and
reliable water services if this is not always matched by a universal willingness and ability to fully cover the
costs of operation and maintenance among water users. This challenge is by no means a new one. It is a
key reason why a supply driven approach to rural water programming met with disappointing results [Bris-
coe and de Ferranti, 1988]. However, with the escalated ambition to achieve universal access, policymakers,
and practitioners will need to devise strategies that concurrently expand coverage to the 270 million people
without improved water source access (UNICEF/WHO, 2016) and ensure sustainable systems of operation
and maintenance, even where some users lack the requisite demand and wherewithal to pay the full costs
of those services. It is for this reason alternative financing sources may need to play a greater role in cover-
ing recurrent maintenance costs in the coming years [Franceys et al., 2016].
4.1. Study Limitations
The analyses and interpretations in this study come with a number of qualifications and limitations. First,
the operational outcome indicator utilized in the sustainability analysis was self-reported downtime for
the previous 12 months, and therefore susceptible to recall bias. To mitigate this issue, future studies
should seek to measure downtime in a more robust fashion, possibly through the use of emerging mon-
itoring technologies [Thomson et al., 2012; Nagel et al., 2015]. Second, the results may be affected by
selection bias, as the inclusion criteria limited the financial analysis to those committees keeping finan-
cial records, the operational analysis was focused on those waterpoints which had had at least one
breakdown and repair in the previous 12 months, and all analyses were restricted to waterpoints that
had been functional at some point within the previous 12 months. As such, those waterpoints analyzed
tended to have slightly wealthier users, produce better tasting water, and exhibited other geographical
and hydrogeological differences compared with those waterpoints that did not meet the inclusion crite-
ria (see supporting information Tables S3 and S4). Third, no causal relationships can be conclusively
demonstrated between explanatory and outcome variables, and the effects of confounding or reverse
causation cannot be ruled out. For example, there may be other unobserved factors that explain why
users are able to repair the handpump more promptly or opt for unimproved sources that also underlie
the community’s decision to adopt a particular revenue collection approach. Finally, the accuracy of the
revenue and expenditure calculations is dependent on the quality of the original records kept by water
committees. Though anomalies and ambiguities evident in the records were discussed and clarified
with water committee members, the possibility of undetected errors or omitted information cannot be
ruled out.
5. Conclusions
This study has shed light on the relationships between revenue collection approach, the financial and
operational performance of waterpoints, and the water source choices of households in rural Kenya.
Though it remains an uncommon revenue collection strategy in some parts of rural sub-Saharan Africa,
the evidence from Kwale County suggests that pay-as-fetch waterpoints generate more income and
experience shorter downtime than waterpoints with flat fee arrangements. The trade-off is that a higher
proportion of households opt to use an unimproved drinking water source, either because of the
increased excludability, the higher unit cost of water, or a combination of the two. Thus in Kwale, neither
pay-as-you-fetch nor flat fee arrangements can be said to achieve the twin goals of sustainable and uni-
versally accessed water services. Further investigation is required to understand why some communities
independently choose pay-as-you-fetch arrangements, and the extent to which there is a community
consensus on the adoption of an exclusionary model that accepts higher costs and unimproved drinking
water use in exchange for superior operational outcomes. Regardless, if the SDG of ‘‘safe water for all’’ is
to become a reality, policymakers and practitioners cannot tacitly endorse such trade-offs, but instead
must ensure rural water services are financially viable, reliable and inclusive. Action research is required
to determine the combination of institutional, financial, and operational arrangements needed to make
this happen.
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